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DID FDR

PEARL

KNOW?
By David M. Culver

t precisely 7:55 a.m., Sunday,
December 7, 1941, the Japanese
launched a devastating air attack on Hawaii,
leaving 2403 Americans dead, eight
battleships crippled or destroyed, and 188
planes demolished. "The worse disaster in
the military annals of the United States," in
the words of a noted historian, plunged
America into a global war and permanently
changed the country. Isolationism was
dead. Americans were united to win the
war, and they were resolved never again to
be caught by surprise. At the same time,
they wanted to know why the Army and
Navy were caught napping. Thus began a
years-long search for scapegoats, a search
which would lead to much confusion, bitter
controversy, and the sensational charge
that President Franklin Roosevelt had prior
knowledge of the Japanese attack.
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When news of the massive Japanese
strike was received, Americans reeled with
anger, shock and humiliation. They were
furious because the Japanese had launched
a sneak attack under the cover of
negotiations to settle differences between
the two countries. Editorials rang with
denunciations of Japanese deceit. Cried
one Georgia newspaper, "Oh, the
dishonesty and trickery of it all."
Behind the nation's £Wry was the nagging
question asked by public officials and
private citizens alike. With war so obviously
ready to break out in the Pacific, why did the
attack catch us by surprise? Henry
Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury,
following a meeting with President
Roosevelt after the attack, told his
associates, "It is just unexplainablp.." They
caught us unprepared, he said, all the planes
in one place and the battleships lined up in
perfect rows. "They can never explain this.
They never will be able to explain it."
Senator Tom Connolly of Texas was
equally baffled. Meeting with President
Roosevelt the evening of the attack, the
Senator pounded a desk and shouted,
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"Pearl Harbor never
dies and no living
person has seen the
end of it."
Counsel for Admiral Husband Kimmel,
Hawaiian Naval Commander

"How did they catch us with our pants
down, Mr. President?"
Many Americans wanted an answer to
that question and the smoke had hardly
cleared when there were outraged calls for
an investigation. Within weeks of the
tragedy, President Roosevelt appointed a
blue-ribbon committee, headed by Supreme
Court Justice Owert Roberts, to investigate
the attack. The Roberts Commission placed
the blame on the Hawaiian commanders,
Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lt. General
Walter Short.
But the search for villains had only begun,
the public's interest only whetted. Even as
the war was being waged, no fewer than six
more official investigations sought answers
to the Pearl Harbor mystery, in the midst of
a welter of discord and charges of
whitewash. By 1945, critics of President
Roosevelt were suggesting that he had
maneuvered the country into war and knew
in advance of the Japanese attack. That was
the charge made by the rabidly antiRoosevelt Chicago Tribune in a September
1945 editorial. In the same month, John
Chamberlain asserted in Life that ". . .
Roosevelt . .. knew in advance that the
Japanese were going to attack us. There is
even ground for suspicion that he elected to
bring the crisis to a head when it came."
While Pearl Harbor had united Americans in
a determination to defeat the Japanese, it
divided them, often bitterly, in assessing
blame for the disaster.

With the war over and Pearl Harbor still a
mystery, Congress, with much fanfare,
lauched its own investigation. One of its
objectives was to clarify President
Roosevelt's role in the Pearl Harbor story.
For eight months (November 1945 - July
1946), the committee scrutinized
Roosevelt's policy, military preparations,
and intelligence information.
For the first time the public learned of
Magic, the code name of the disclosures
obtained by American intelligence. In 1940
and 1941, American cryptanalysts had
broken several Japanese diplomatic codes
and throughout 1941 the United States had
been reading virtually all messages between
Japanese embassies and the Foreign Office
in Tokyo. The hearings revealed that
through Magic the United States knew of
Japan's planned move into Southeast Asia
and the deadline it set for successful
negotiations with America. If diplomatic
success was not achieved by November 29,
1941, Magic read, "things are automatically
going to happen." It was on the basis of such
intelligence that the government sent out a
war warning to Pacific commanders on
November 27.
The long legislative inquiry, often
rancorous and partisan, was the most
extensive ever undertaken by Congress,
and the record of its hearings is an
incomparable source of information. As
expected, the Committee was not
unanimous in allocating responsibility for
the debacle, noting mistakes in both Hawaii
and Washington. But it found no evidence
that Washington knew in advance or that
the government "tricked, provoked, incited,
cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this
nation ... "
By the time of Congress' investigation,
two schools of thought had coalesced to
continue the Pearl Harbor debate. One
school, the orthodox, while recognizing
mistakes in Washington, assigned much of
the blame to Kimmell and Short. The
Hawaiian commanders had been warned
that war with Japan was imminent, but did
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not take adequate precautions. Their job
had been to protect the fleet and they failed.
The other school, the revisionist, armed
with knowledge of Magic, blamed President
Roosevelt, certain Cabinet officials, and the
top military leaders in Washington for the
Pearl Harbor tragedy. Revisionists
lambasted the whole course of Roosevelt's
diplomacy, arguing variously that he lied to
the American people, that he withheld
intelligence from his Pacific commanders,
that he knew the attack was coming, and
that he had even schemed the whole thing
so that the United States could enter the
war.
This last charge formed the basis of the
back-door thesis. According to revisionists,
Roosevelt was bent on taking the United
States into war against Germany and did his
best to provoke Adolf Hitler. But the
German dictator would not oblige the
American President, so the scheming
Roosevelt provoked Japan into attacking
the United States. Because Germany and
Japan were allies, war with one meant war
with the other. Roosevelt would then have
his war against Germany, the real enemy,
through the back door.
While the revisionists raised important
questions, their case was a marred by iIIdisguised personal hatred of President
Roosevelt. More significantly, their thesis
was based largely on innuendo, for no c1earcut proof exists to support it. Most
historians have rejected the revisionist
position, but the legend endures. Each year
students, whose knowledge of history is
slight, ask whether Roosevelt knew of the
Japanese attack, and many Americans, not
just Roosevelt-haters, accept this view.
Last year the old argument of how much
Washington knew about Pearl Harbor was
renewed with the publication of Gordon W.

Prange's At Dawn We Slept, and John
Toland's Infamy. Prange, who spent more
than 30 years on his monumental tome,
belongs to the orthodox school. During the
occupation of Japan after the war, Prange
was chief of the Army Intelligence Historical
Section and used his position to interview
virtually every Japanese officer who had a
part in the attack. He also interviewed
numerous Americans who were involved,
and he seems to have read everything that
has been published on the subject.
Following his untimely death in May 1980,
two former students completed his work.
The result is a comprehensive account
written from both the American and
Japanese points of view. Prange's
conclusion: there was no conspiracy and he
assigns much of the blame for Pearl Harbor
to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
John Toland, on the other hand, a
Pulitzer Prize winner for The Rising Sun,
fans the conspiratorial flames by charging
that Roosevelt knew in advance of the
Japanese attack, indeed welcomed it, but
withheld this information from Kimmel and
Short. As Toland concludes, "The comedy
of errors on the sixth and seventh (of
December 1941) appears incredible. It only
makes sense if it were a charade, and
Roosevelt and the inner circle had known
about the attack." Roosevelt's motive,
according to Toland, was to get the United
States into the war against Germany. Later,
the Hawaiian commanders were made
scapegoats, victims of a vast FOR-led coverup of the plot.
Like other revisionists, Toland
emphasizes the "winds execute" message.
In late November 1941, Magic revealed that
the words "East wind rain" inserted in daily
news broadcasts would be Tokyo's signal to
Japanese embassies that a break in
diplomatic relations with the United States
was imminent. According to Toland's two
witnesses, the message was received in
code, but was not forwarded to United
States commanders. Whether the message
was ever received, though, is doubtful, for
nearly all the other witnesses who testified
during the official investigation deny that
such a message was ever received.
Japanese sources deny any such message
was sent. And the message, according to
Toland, was received in Morse code, though
it was supposed to be broadcast in plain
language.
It is difficult to determine why Toland
places such emphasis on the winds-execute
code. As Congress concluded in 1946, even
if it had been sent and intercepted it would
have added nothing to what the United
States already knew from other intelligence
sources; and it in no way indicated an attack
on Pearl Harbor.

Another prop in the Toland thesis deals
with radio traffic picked up in early
December 1941, by two Americans who,
according to Toland, separately located the
Japanese strike force heading toward Pearl
Harbor. One listener, a mysterious Seaman
First Class Z--whose name will be disclosed
one day--tracked the Japanese carrier force
to a position 400 miles north-northwest of
Hawaii. The other American was a radio
man aboard the liner Lurline who located
radio signals coming from a Japanese force
"north and west of Honolulu." Both handed
their information to superiors in naval
intelligence who apparently did nothing
about it.
The problem with this sensational bit of
information is that the Japanese task force
heading for Pearl Harbor maintained
complete radio silence. Surviving members
of the Japanese staff who planned the attack
deny Toland's allegation, and maintain that
the ships communicated with one another
only by blinker or flag. Toland, in the end,
asks tantalizing questions, which
underscore the mysteries in the Pearl
Harbor story, but he does not convincingly
supply the answers. He demonstrates
neither conspiracy nor cover-up_
Beyond his failure to prove his points, his
theory, and revisionism in general, is full of
holes. If Roosevelt wanted war, why would
he risk a good part of the Pacific fleet -- the
very forces he would need in a Pacific war -at the very beginning? It makes no sense to
enter a war that Roosevelt presumably
wanted to win with a stunning defeat.
Some revisionists respond that Roosevelt
was willing to sacrifice obsolescent
battleships. But Roosevelt had no way of
knowing that the Japanese would only
attack battleships and not the more important, both strategically and logistically,
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intelligence said it was, it could not be
elsewhere.

Planes and hangars at the Ford Island Naval Air Station
go up in flames and smoke as the attack continues.

fuel tanks and repair facilities. Had the vital
fuel supply been destroyed, what was left of
the Pacific fleet would have had to pull back
to West Coast ports, abandoning the Pacific
to the Japanese. As it was, Pearl Harbor was
quickly resurrected and the fleet rebuilt.
As for the back·door thesis, which the
revisionists rely upon to prove conspiracy,
that, too, makes no sense. The revisionists
assume that Roosevelt welcomed the attack
so that the United States could ultimately
enter the war against Hitler. But the Axis
alliance was defensive; and just as Japan
was under no obligation to go to war against
the Soviet Union when Germany attacked
in June 1941, Germany was under no
obligation if Japan attacked the United
States. Roosevelt, then, could not know
that a Pacific war could serve as a back door
to the European war.
If revisionist theory founders on evidence
and common sense, why then was America
caught by surprise? One explanation lies in
American racism, which led the United
States to underestimate greatly the "little
yellow people" with buck-teeth and silly
grins. Americans viewed Japan as
backward, its pilots nearsighted, its planes
inferior. The oriental, with "feet of clay",
would have neither the audacity nor the
ability to attack a bastion of western defense
like Pearl Harbor. "The Japanese are not
going to risk a fight with a first-class nation,"
proclaimed Congressman Charles I. Faddis
of Pennsylvania, in February 1941, and that
was the general view of both the American
military and the general public. Indeed, after
the attack, some Americans thought that
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Germans must have been flying those
planes.
Of course, the United States knew by late
November· early December 1941 that the
Japanese were ready to strike, but
American leaders were virtually hypnotized
by Japan's drive toward Southeast Asia.
There were plenty of reports to indicate
war. For example, on December 1, 1941,
Magic revealed that Japan had told
Germany that there is "extreme danger" of
war between Japan and America and "the
start of this war may be quicker than anyone
dreams." Two days later, America learned
that Japanese embassies had been
instructed to burn diplomatic codes, a sure
sign of war. On December 6, intelligence
reported two large Japanese fleets rounding
the tip of Southern Indo-China, and on the
same day an intercept indicated a break in
diplomatic relations. Indeed, when
President Roosevelt read this last message,
he said, "This means war."
While the American government glumly
awaited the attack, its attention was
centered almost exclusively on Southeast
Asia, where intelligence reports indicated
the blow would come and where, in fact, the
principal Japanese strike occurred. Not one
intercept specifically mentioned an attack
on Pearl Harbor, which was thousands of
miles east and presumably of little value to
the Japanese.
American naval leaders were also blinded
to the possibility of an attack on Pearl
Harbor by standard naval doctrine, which
said that you did not divide your fleet. If the
Japanese fleet were in Southeast Asia, as

And so on that fateful day in early
December, the Japanese launched one of
the most brilliant, daring and surprising
naval operations in history. Even though a
war warning went out, reconnaissance
planes stayed put and there was no change
in a relaxed weekend routine. Americans
never really accepted the possibility that
Japan would attack Pearl Harbor. As one
naval officer put it, "Americans did not
believe," and it was this improbability that
was the essential element of Japanese
success.
Pearl Harbor was the result of numerous
related and complicated factors: Japanese
military skill and uncommon luck, false
American assumptions, inadequate
American intelligence, and numerous
blunders, such as the one by an American
officer who told a radar operator "don't
worry about it" when the operator reported
seeing planes on his screen two minutes
after seven o'clock Sunday morning. But
these errors were of the human kind, the
kind that all nations make. There was no
conspiracy, no cover-up.
More than 40 years after the event there
are still many unanswered questions about
the attack and Pearl Harbor remains, in
Prange's words, "the eternal enigma." The
attack has been exhaustively studied and
millions of words have been recorded in
trying to explain it. Perhaps because it is so
baffling and incomprehensible, a conspiracy
theory will continue to enjoy acceptance
and Toland's mischief will keep it alive for a
while yet. But on the basis of all the
information we have now, President
Roosevelt did not know and was as
surprised by the tragedy as any American.
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